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ABSTRACT  
The attorney-client privilege is the most sacred and important 
privilege in our legal system. Despite being at the center of daily 
practice, the privilege still remains a mystery for many lawyers. 
This is primarily because the privilege is not absolute, and there 
are certain actions or non-actions that may waive it.  
The application of the privilege is further complicated by 
electronic discovery, which has both benefits and drawbacks. On 
one hand, it has made the practice of law more efficient. On the 
other hand, it has made it easier to inadvertently waive the 
attorney-client privilege in response to a discovery request. This 
iBrief examines attorney-client privilege issues that may arise 
during e-discovery, and provides practical guidelines for attorneys 
responding to e-discovery requests. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The rapid computerization of the 1990s has altered the litigation 
landscape.2 Most businesses have moved away from storing documents in 
file cabinets and warehouses as documents are increasingly stored 
electronically.3 Consequently, litigators must increasingly respond to 
subpoena requests for electronically stored information (ESI). These 
requests will continue to increase as experts estimate that nearly one-third 
of electronically stored documents remains solely in digital form.4 
                                                      
1 Duke University School of Law, J.D. 2009; University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill, B.A. Political Science and International Studies, Highest 
Distinction and Honors 2006. Adjoa Linzy is an Associate at DLA Piper’s 
International Trade Practice Group. The views expressed in this article are solely 
hers and do not represent those of DLA Piper. 
2 Vlaid Vainberg, When Should Discovery Come with a Bill? Assessing Cost 
Shifting for Electronic Discovery, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1523, 1532 (2010). 
3 Id.  
4 Corinne L. Giacobbe, Note, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age: 
Deciding Who Should Bear the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored 
Data, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257, 259 (2000). 
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¶2 To non-attorneys, responding to a subpoena request for ESI simply 
involves inserting a thumb drive into a USB port and copying the requested 
files. However, document production entails more than just copying hard 
drives and e-mails and sending those copies to opposing counsel. Attorneys 
must exercise extreme care in producing ESI because an inadvertent 
disclosure of any document may waive attorney-client privilege. This iBrief 
aims to balance a theoretical and practical approach to attorney-client issues 
that may arise during e-discovery. 
¶3 Part I of this iBrief provides an overview of the attorney-client 
privilege. Part II discusses the rise of e-discovery. Part III discusses 
attorney-client issues that may arise during e-discovery. Part IV provides 
practical guidelines for attorneys responding to e-discovery requests.  
I. OVERVIEW OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
¶4 The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized 
privileges for confidential communications.5 Most states codify the 
privilege in a statute or rule;6 others still rely on common law.7 Courts have 
articulated the elements of the privilege in different ways. The attorney-
client privilege applies only if 
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client;  
(2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member 
of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this 
communication is acting as a lawyer;  
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was 
informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for 
the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) 
legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) 
for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and  
(4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.8 
¶5 The purpose of the privilege is “to encourage full and frank 
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote 
                                                      
5 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). See also Hunt v. 
Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (“[Privilege] is founded upon the necessity, in 
the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of 
the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily 
availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.”). 
6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. d (2000). 
7 Id. 
8 United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982) (quoting United 
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358–59 (D. Mass. 1950)). 
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broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of 
justice.”9 The privilege “rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to 
know all that relates to the client’s reasons for seeking representation if the 
professional mission is to be carried out.”10 
¶6 The privilege is not absolute and must be narrowly construed since 
it impedes full and free discovery of the truth. The Supreme Court notes that  
testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the 
fundamental principle that “‘the public . . . has a right to every man’s 
evidence.” As such, [the privilege] must be strictly construed and 
accepted “only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to 
testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending 
the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for 
ascertaining truth.”11  
¶7 The privilege belongs to the client.12 The attorney must properly 
assert the privilege on the client’s behalf and take care to not waive it.13  
¶8 At first glance, application of the attorney-client privilege seems 
very simple. However, federal courts are not in agreement on the contours 
of the privilege. Different circuits analyze the privilege using different 
factors. Thus, attorney-client privilege analysis is far from a settled area of 
law, especially when it involves ESI.14  
II. THE RISE OF E-DISCOVERY  
¶9 E-discovery is the discovery of electronically stored information 
(ESI). Some estimates show that more than ninety percent of all information 
is created in an electronic format.15 As a result, ESI has become the primary 
source of evidence in litigation.16 This development has increased the 
                                                      
9 Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389. 
10 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). 
11 Id. (quotations omitted).   
12 In re Vargas, 723 F.2d 1461, 1466 (10th Cir. 1983); Commonwealth v. 
Edwards, 370 S.E.2d 296, 301 (Va. 1988). 
13 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 86 (2000). 
14 As a result, the Supreme Court has held that the privilege’s applicability 
should be determined on a case-by-case basis. See generally Trammel, 445 U.S. 
at 47 (referring to legislative history for Federal Rules of Evidence regarding 
privilege). 
15 THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON BEST PRACTICES FOR 
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT RETENTION & PRODUCTION, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES 
FOR ELEC. DOCUMENT PROD. 1 (2004) [hereinafter SEDONA PRINCIPLES], 
available at 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=SedonaPrinciples200401.pdf. 
16 See generally id. 
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overall cost of responding to discovery requests. According to the authors of 
the 2008 Socha-Gelbmann Electronic Discovery Report, litigants spent $2.7 
billion on e-discovery in 2007, an increase of 43% from 2006.17 This 
expenditure is expected to grow by 21%, 20%, and 15% in 2008, 2009, and 
2010 respectively.18  
¶10 E-discovery requires attorneys to alter their typical response to 
discovery lest they inadvertently disclose privileged information. This is 
because in today’s electronic age, it is fairly easy to mistakenly send 
information to opposing counsel due to the sheer volume of information that 
Attorneys’ must read during discovery. Attorneys’ responses should change 
because there are significant differences between conventional document 
and electronic document production.19 
¶11 Differences between conventional and electronic discovery exist in 
degree, kind, and cost.20 The “volume, number of locations, and data 
volatility” is significantly greater in e-discovery than in conventional 
discovery.21 For example,  
[a] floppy disk, with 1.44 megabytes, is the equivalent of 720 
typewritten pages of plain text. A CD-ROM, with 650 megabytes, can 
hold up to 325,000 typewritten pages. One gigabyte is the equivalent 
of 500,000 typewritten pages. Large corporate computer networks 
create backup data measured in terabytes or 1,000,000 megabytes: 
each terabyte represents the equivalent of 500 [m]illion typewritten 
pages of plain text.22  
¶12 One article estimates that a company with one hundred employees 
sending an average of 25 e-mails daily produces about 625,000 e-mails 
yearly.23 Another study showed that  
                                                      
17 George Socha & Tom Gelbman, A Look at the 2008 Socha-Gelbmann Survey, 
L. TECH. NEWS (Aug. 11, 2008), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=120242364
6479. 
18 Id.  
19 Richard Van Duizend, Conference of Chief Justices: Guidelines for State 
Trial Courts Regarding Discovery of Electronically-Stored Information, NAT’L 
CENTER FOR ST. CTS., vi (Aug. 2006), 
http://www.ncsconline.org/images/EDiscCCJGuidelinesFinal.pdf. 
20 Id. at v, vi. 
21 Id. at v. 
22 Id. (citations omitted). 
23 Id. Many of the statistics in the Conference of Chief Justices Guidelines are 
condensed directly from a presentation on electronic discovery by Ken Withers, 
former Senior Judicial Education Attorney at the Federal Judicial Center, to the 
National Workshop for United States Magistrate Judges on June 12, 2002. 
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[i]n 1998, the U.S. Postal Service processed approximately 1.98 billion 
pieces of mail. That year, there were approximately 47 million e-mail 
users in the United States who sent an estimated 500 million e-mail 
messages per day, for a total of approximately 182.5 billion e-mail 
messages per year—more than 90 times as many messages as the U.S. 
Postal Service handled the same year.24 
¶13 The e-discovery process, already burdening attorneys with a 
voluminous number of e-mails to sift through, is further complicated when 
discoverable e-mails are automatically deleted by the hosting e-mail 
servers.25 And most complicated of all, deleted data is not necessarily 
deleted. Rather, the computer has been instructed to ignore the data marked 
deleted and overwrite it only if space is needed.26  
¶14 It is therefore possible that deleted data exists and is retrievable, 
unbeknownst to its custodian.27 Consequently, many attorneys now request 
that opposing counsel turn over all e-mails, including deleted e-mails. Some 
attorneys go a step further, requiring forensic computer experts to examine 
the hard drives in search of deleted e-mails. This has caused the e-discovery 
process to become increasingly burdensome and costly.  
¶15 Another contributing factor to the burdensome nature of e-
discovery is the existence of metadata. Metadata is information embedded 
in an electronic file about that file, including author and date of creation.28 It 
is increasingly common for attorneys to request that information in 
discovery. Complying with this request presents a variety of problems.29 
¶16 The final and most important difference between conventional and 
electronic discovery is the cost. Because attorneys increasingly hire 
computer forensic experts to sort through the ESI, the cost of litigation has 
increased astronomically. One client reportedly spent about $6.2 million to 
restore ninety-three backup tapes.30 Cost is arguably the most litigated e-
discovery issue. And although not extensively explored in this iBrief, a brief 
discussion of the leading federal case on cost—Zubulake v. UBS Warburg31 
—is necessary; as it clarifies the difference between conventional discovery 
and e-discovery. 
¶17 Zubulake establishes three considerations for determining which 
party should bear the cost of discovery: (1) accessibility, (2) less costly 
                                                      
24 SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 3. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 See generally id. at 4. 
30 Van Duizend, supra note 19, at vi.  
31 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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means of obtaining the information requested, and (3) cost-benefit analysis 
based on the facts of the case. Zubulake, among other cases, prompted the 
2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the 
previous rules, the costs of complying with the discovery request were 
presumed to be borne by the responding party.32 Under the post-Zubulake 
amendments, “[a] party need not provide discovery of electronically stored 
information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost.”33 However, a court may still 
order discovery upon a showing of good cause.34 Some commentators have 
opined that the new rules do not help courts decide who should bear the 
burden of costs.35 Nevertheless, the amendments underscore that e-
discovery is different from traditional discovery.  
¶18 As discussed above, e-discovery goes beyond the mere copying and 
saving of data. Parties responding to e-discovery requests must review the 
data, ensuring that only relevant and non-privileged information is sent to 
opposing counsel. Due to the burdensome nature of sorting through all 
electronic data, most attorneys outsource this task to companies who 
specialize in e-discovery. These companies use sophisticated software to 
collect, filter, process, and review the data. Some companies go a step 
beyond merely collecting data, sorting it by key words such as attorney and 
client names. However, this does not eliminate attorneys’ responsibility to 
review documents to ensure that no privileged information is inadvertently 
sent to opposing parties.  
III. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE & E-DISCOVERY 
¶19 Although attorney-client privilege belongs solely to clients, 
attorneys have an ethical duty to assert the privilege on their clients’ 
behalf.36 As technology has made responding to discovery requests easier, it 
has also become easier to waive the attorney-client privilege without 
intending to do so.37 This error is particularly common because there is no 
consensus among the circuits as to when inadvertent disclosure 
automatically results in waiver of privilege.  
                                                      
32 See id. (citing Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) 
(discussing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) prior to 2006 amendments)). 
33 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
34 Zubulake, 216 F.R.D. at 283. 
35 See generally Duizend, supra note 19, at 7. 
36 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 86 (2000). 
37 See John T. Hundley, Waiver of Evidentiary Privilege by Inadvertent 
Disclosure–Federal Law, 159 A.L.R. FED. 153 (2000). 
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A. Varying Approaches to the Inadvertent Disclosure Problem 
¶20 Whether an inadvertent disclosure of ESI waives attorney-client 
privilege has engendered three different schools of thought. The first treats 
inadvertent disclosure as an automatic waiver. The second holds that an 
inadvertent disclosure never results in an automatic waiver. The third takes 
a middle-ground, using a multi-factor test to determine whether the 
privilege has been waived.  
1. Jurisdictions in Which Inadvertent Disclosure Automatically Waives 
Attorney-Client Privilege 
¶21 Courts subscribing to the first school of thought—that any 
involuntary disclosure of privilege automatically waives the privilege38—
take an objective view of inadvertent disclosure, holding the privilege 
waived irrespective of the number of documents disclosed. For example, in 
In re Sealed Case,39 the D.C. Circuit held that the disclosure, although 
inadvertent, automatically waived the attorney-client privilege: 
Although the attorney-client privilege is of ancient lineage and 
continuing importance, the confidentiality of communications covered 
by the privilege must be jealously guarded by the holder of the 
privilege lest it be waived. The courts will grant no greater protection 
to those who assert the privilege than their own precautions warrant. 
We therefore agree with those courts which have held that the 
privilege is lost “even if the disclosure is inadvertent.”40  
¶22 Generally, courts that follow this rule do not consider the number of 
documents waived or whether immediate steps were taken to correct the 
error. Once a document has been mistakenly turned over, attorney-client 
privilege is considered waived. Thus, the privilege is waived in these 
jurisdictions even when “immediate steps were taken to correct the error [of 
inadvertent disclosure].”41 The court elaborated on this point:  
                                                      
38 FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 482 (E.D. Va. 
1991). Cf. Standard Chartered Bank PLC v. Ayala Int’l Holdings (U.S.) Inc., 
111 F.R.D. 76, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (addressing case law that does not involve 
claims of inadvertent disclosure and suggesting that an instance of inadvertent 
disclosure can be so insignificant as to not constitute a waiver); Georgetown 
Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 937 (S.D. Fla. 1991) 
(acknowledging that federal courts are split on the issue of whether privilege is 
waived in the event of an inadvertent disclosure).  
39 In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  
40 Id. at 980 (citation omitted). 
41Wichita Land & Cattle Co. v. Am. Fed. Bank, F.S.B., 148 F.R.D. 456, 461 
(D.D.C. 1992).  
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To find waiver in these circumstances may seem a harsh  
result . . . . There is a tension between the principle of unfettered 
judicial access to all relevant evidence on the one hand, and on the 
other, the policy supporting evidentiary privileges, which encourage 
complete candor between client and lawyer, as well as thorough case 
preparation that is essential to the adversary system. Liberal 
application of waiver discourages organizations from broadly labeling 
materials “privileged.” The more documents that are so labeled, the 
greater the likelihood of an inadvertent disclosure that will render all 
related communications discoverable. “[I]f a client wishes to preserve 
the privilege, it must treat the confidentiality of attorney-client 
communications like jewels—if not crowned jewels.”42  
¶23 In the eyes of this court, once the document has been seen, the 
privilege is considered waived. Attorneys who frequently find themselves in 
forums like the D.C. Circuit, which follow the automatic waiver rule, 
should take extra care to prevent inadvertent disclosure; for inadvertent 
disclosures will always waive the attorney-client privilege in these 
jurisdictions. Practical tips to avoid inadvertent disclosure are discussed in 
Part IV of this iBrief.43  
2. Jurisdictions in Which Inadvertent Disclosure Never Waives Attorney-
Client Privilege 
¶24 As mentioned above, courts are not consistent in finding waiver of 
attorney-client privilege. While some courts find automatic waiver, others 
adhere to the “no waiver rule,” holding that the attorney-client privilege can 
never be waived in e-discovery through inadvertent disclosure of privileged 
documents. These courts often presume that negligence of counsel during 
discovery cannot constitute waiver because the privilege belongs to the 
client, and only the client can waive it. In these jurisdictions, not even an 
attorney’s negligence in failing to review documents will waive the 
privilege.44  
¶25 In Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co.,45 the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois held that an attorney’s inadvertent 
production of privileged letters in a patent infringement action did not 
constitute waiver of the attorney-client privilege.46 The court stated that 
attorneys are “taught from first year law school that waiver imports the 
                                                      
42 Id. at 461–62 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
43 See discussion infra Part IV. 
44 See, e.g., Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 
12, 21 (D. Neb. 1983) (finding that, while negligence on an attorney’s part is 
unacceptable, it is not necessary to impose sanctions)). 
45 Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
46 Id. at 955. 
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‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’”47 The court 
reasoned that “[i]nadvertent production is the antithesis of that concept.”48 
While the court agreed that counsel might have been negligent in failing to 
go through the letters before production, the court nevertheless refused to 
find waiver of privilege, affirming that courts should require more than 
mere negligence of counsel before finding waiver.49 Attorneys who find 
themselves in such a forum can consider themselves lucky: waiver will 
never be found so long as it is the attorneys’ or their agents’ (usually an e-
discovery company) negligence that results in the inadvertent disclosure. 
However, just because attorneys find themselves in such a forum does not 
mean they should fail to review documents before handing them over to 
opposing counsel. As discussed in Part IV of this iBrief, this behavior may 
result in some ethical violations of an attorney’s duty to represent clients 
diligently.  
3. Jurisdictions Employing a Multi-Factor Analysis to Determine if 
Attorney-Client Privilege is Waived by Inadvertent Disclosures 
¶26 The third and final school of thought adheres to a middle-ground 
approach. This approach, known as the Lois Sportswear rule, uses a fact-
intensive analysis to determine the outcome of privileged cases. 50 Some of 
the factors considered in evaluating whether an inadvertent disclosure 
constitutes a waiver include: (1) reasonableness of the precautions taken to 
prevent inadvertent disclosures, (2) the time taken to rectify the error, (3) 
the scope of discovery, (4) the extent of the disclosure, and (5) the 
overriding issue of fairness.51 No one factor is determinative, but, as one 
court opines, “perhaps the most important circumstance is the number of 
documents involved. As the number of documents grows, so too must the 
level of effort increase to avoid an inadvertent disclosure.”52 
¶27 The Fourth Circuit has subscribed to this middle-ground approach.53 
In FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., a United States District 
                                                      
47 Id. (citation omitted). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
51 FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 482 (E.D. Va. 
1991) (citing Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105); see also Tri-County Paving, 
Inc. v. Ashe Cnty., No. 5:99-CV-105, 2000 WL 1811606, at *3–4 (W.D.N.C. 
Oct. 5, 2000)); Kan. City Power & Light Co. v. Pittsburg & Midway Coal 
Mining Co., 133 F.R.D. 171, 172 (D. Kan. 1989). 
52 FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 483 (E.D. Va. 
1991). 
53 See id. at 482; see also McCafferty’s, Inc. v. Bank of Glen Burnie, 179 F.R.D. 
163, 167 (D. Md. 1998). 
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Court in Virginia court opted for a factor-based test. The court found that 
both the automatic and no-waiver rules were too extreme. The court 
reasoned that  
inadvertent disclosure is a species of waiver and must be analyzed in 
that light. Waivers must typically be intentional or knowing acts. 
Inadvertent disclosures are, by definition, unintentional acts, but 
disclosures may occur under circumstances of such extreme or gross 
negligence as to warrant deeming the act of disclosure to be 
intentional.54 Put another way, “[i]t is not too much to insist that if a 
client wishes to preserve the privilege under such circumstances, he 
must take some affirmative action to preserve confidentiality. . . 
[t]aking or failing to take precautions may be considered as bearing on 
intent.”55  
¶28 The court opted for a fact-intensive analysis by looking at the facts 
in the case and how they influenced the five factors mentioned above.  
¶29 In Scott v. Glickman,56 the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of North Carolina held that the attorney-client privilege was 
waived because of a party’s failure to put measures in place to prevent 
inadvertent disclosures. The court based its conclusion on several facts: 
document production was not very onerous; there were no time constraints 
impacting the document production; the attorney did not spend an extensive 
amount of time trying to prevent inadvertent production of privileged 
materials; and no special efforts were made to ensure confidentiality.57  
¶30 An earlier case, Parkway Gallery Furniture v. Kittinger 
Pennsylvania House Group, Inc.,58 held that the defendant waived the 
attorney-client privilege for failing to take precautions that would have 
prevented disclosure. The court reasoned that “[a] large number of 
inadvertent disclosures in comparison to [only a small] number of 
documents reviewed shows lax, careless, and inadequate procedures.”59 
However, the court limited the scope of the privilege, holding that an 
inadvertent disclosure of documents did not require further disclosure of 
other privileged documents relating to the same subject matter: 
                                                      
54 Marine Midland, 138 F.R.D. at 482 (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
727 F.2d 1352, 1352 (4th Cir. 1984). 
55 Id.  
56 199 F.R.D. 174 (E.D.N.C. 2001). 
57 Id.; see also O’Leary v. Purcell Co., 108 F.R.D. 641 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (holding 
attorney-client privilege waived because the attorney had made no special efforts to 
ensure confidentiality). 
58 116 F.R.D. 46 (M.D.N.C. 1987). 
59 Id. at 51 (citing Eigenheim Bank v. Halpern, 598 F. Supp. 988, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984)). 
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The general rule that a disclosure waives not only the specific 
communication but also the subject matter of it in other 
communications is not appropriate in the case of inadvertent 
disclosure. In a proper case of inadvertent disclosure, the waiver 
should cover only the specific document in issue. This ruling limits the 
risk to parties in major discovery cases and still makes them, and not 
the Court, accountable for maintaining confidentiality.60 
¶31 The middle-ground approach appears to be the most reasonable and 
appealing analysis of the three mentioned herein. The Supreme Court 
appears to agree; it has repeatedly held—albeit not in this context—that 
privilege issues should be decided on a case-by-case basis.61 The Court 
stated in Upjohn Co. v. United States that “[w]hile such a ‘case-by-case’ 
basis may to some slight extent undermine desirable certainty in the 
boundaries of the attorney-client privilege, it obeys the spirit of the 
Rules.”62 And because attorney-client privilege issues are presented in 
various forms, a factor-based test would ensure that the spirit of the rules—
which is to encourage frank communications between attorneys and their 
clients—will be upheld. 
¶32 Several states have realized that the case law on e-discovery is not 
consistent. Consequently, the Conference of Chief Justices has published 
guidelines to assist courts in considering issues related to e-discovery.63 The 
guidelines state that judges should consider the following factors in an 
inadvertent disclosure case: the total volume of information produced by the 
responding party, the amount of privileged information disclosed, the 
reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure of 
privileged information, the promptness of the actions taken to notify the 
receiving party and otherwise remedy the error, and the reasonable 
expectations and agreements of counsel.64 These factors mirror the Lois 
Sportswear factor test. Their goal is the same: to determine waiver of 
attorney-client privilege on a case-by-case basis. 
B. Inadvertent Disclosure of Metadata 
¶33 Metadata is “information describing the history, tracking, or 
management of an electronic document.”65 It is information about 
documents that is recorded by a user’s computer to assist the computer in 
                                                      
60 Id. at 52. 
61 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980); see also United States 
v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367 (1980). 
62 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396–97 (1981). 
63 See generally Duizend, supra note 19.  
64 Id. at 8. 
65 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).  
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retrieving the document at a later date.66 Metadata is often hidden, invisible, 
and normally inaccessible by the computer’s user.67 Examples of metadata 
include comments, edit dates and history, authorship, dates sent and 
received, et cetera.68 Metadata is simply “data about data.”69 
¶34 Metadata is increasingly the subject of litigation. In a case 
stemming from a city police officer’s employment discrimination suit 
against the city, the Arizona Supreme Court held that a police officer’s 
public record requests of electronically formatted records included the 
entire electronic record, even its metadata.70 In that case, the police officer’s 
requested his supervisor’s notes, which documented his work performance. 
71 After reviewing the paper documents, the police officer requested the 
metadata because he suspected the documents were backdated, which the 
City of Phoenix denied.72 The court held that a public entity that maintains a 
public record in electronic format must disclose all information in response 
to a public records request, including embedded metadata.73  
¶35 But does this mean that metadata is to be treated the same as 
ordinary data in the attorney-client privilege context? In other words, what 
happens to metadata if it is inadvertently sent to opposing counsel in a 
discovery request? Does this mean the attorney-client privilege is waived? 
¶36 The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility has held that attorneys may mine for metadata embedded in 
responses to discovery requests.74 Instead of limiting its holding to 
inadvertent disclosures, the committee only limited its holding’s scope to 
metadata that was not obtained in a “fraudulent, deceitful, or otherwise 
improper” manner.75 As a result, an attorney who inadvertently receives 
metadata embedded in privileged electronic documents can argue that the 
privilege has been waived. 
¶37 Contrary to the ABA’s decision, some state bars have required 
attorneys to return privileged metadata transmitted inadvertently.76 These 
                                                      
66 See generally SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 4. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Ned T. Himmelrich, Metadata: Data About Data, MD. B.J., May–June 2010, 
at 34, 36. 
70 Lake v. City of Phoenix, 218 P.3d 1004, 1008 (Ariz. 2009). 
71 Id. at 1004–05. 
72 Id. at 1004. 
73 Id.  
74 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-422 (2006). 
75 Id. 
76 See Himmelrich, supra note 69, at 36. 
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states base their rules primarily on the 2006 amendments to Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Rule 26(b)(5)(B) provides that  
[i]f information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege 
or of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the 
claim may notify any party that received the information of the claim 
and the basis for it. After being notified, a party must promptly return, 
sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it has; 
[and] must not use or disclose the information until the claim is 
resolved.77  
¶38 In the District of Columbia—one of the jurisdictions that does not 
follow the ABA’s decision—attorneys may not mine for metadata if the 
attorney has actual knowledge that the data was sent inadvertently.78 New 
York goes one step further, not requiring actual knowledge—just 
inadvertent submission—to prohibit an attorney’s use of privileged 
metadata.79 Attorneys should check their respective bar rules to ensure that 
they are in compliance with all ethical requirements regarding mining and 
use of metadata. 
IV. PRACTICAL TIPS TO AVOID INADVERTENTLY  
WAIVING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
A. Claw-Back Clause or Quick Peek Agreements 
¶39 Attorneys should enter into claw-back agreements prior to the 
commencement of e-discovery. Claw-back agreements are formal 
agreements that prevent the attorney-client privilege from being waived by 
an inadvertent disclosure of privileged information.80 Rather the receiving 
party must return the privileged material to the responding party.  
¶40 Quick peek agreements allow attorneys to look at each party’s 
entire data before production. Attorneys then designate items that are 
responsive to the discovery request and items that are privileged.81 
Attorneys should ensure that such agreements address electronic documents 
in general and metadata specifically. 
                                                      
77 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5). 
78 D.C. Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 341, available at 
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion341.cfm. 
79 NYCLA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 738 (2008), available at 
http://nyclamail.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications1154_0.pdf.  
80 Van Duizend, supra note 19, at 9. See generally Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. 
Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. Civ. A. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439, at *7 (E.D. La. Feb. 
19, 2002) (noting that court cannot compel the disclosure of privileged 
communications in claw-back arrangement). 
81 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B). 
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¶41 Claw-back clauses and quick peek agreements might not 
necessarily guarantee protection against claims of waiver. For example, 
opposing counsel may renege on a claw-back agreement and argue that 
privilege is waived because opposing counsel has already seen the 
documents, and thus they would no longer uphold any claw-back 
provisions.82 Attorneys should enter these agreements knowing that while 
most courts would uphold them, some might make an exception when 
counsel has already seen the alleged confidential information. 
¶42 Also, some legal experts have said that claw-back agreements 
violate the fundamental premise of an attorney’s duty to represent clients 
zealously.83 By voluntarily entering into such agreements, attorneys are 
tying their hands, so to speak. The prudent measure may be to seek clients’ 
consent before entering into such agreements. 
B. Discovery Hearing or Pre-Trial Conference 
¶43 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) requires parties to confer 
early in litigation to attempt to develop a discovery plan.84 Attorneys should 
take advantage of such pre-trial conferences to address potential disputes 
over electronic discovery. 
¶44 Some commentators have opined that attorneys should voluntarily 
submit to a pre-trial conference to determine the disclosure of ESI, the 
manner of disclosure, and a specific schedule with a timeline.85 Unlike 
claw-back clauses, in which attorneys voluntarily enter into agreements, 
pre-trial conferences are more formal and take place before a judge. A 
judge’s involvement in the pre-trial conference may provide legitimacy to 
the agreement should a dispute arise concerning its validity. 
                                                      
82 See generally In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (nearly 
any disclosure of the communication or document, even inadvertent, waives the 
privilege). 
83 SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 37 (“[C]ounsel has an ethical duty to 
zealously guard the confidences and secrets of the client. It is possible that 
questions could arise as to whether voluntarily entering into a ‘clawback’ 
production could constitute a violation of Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
1.1 (requiring a lawyer to use diligence and care in representation) or Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.6 (protection of client secrets and confidences) 
if the manner of the production results in later waivers of privileges and 
protections. While this result may seem remote, it has already arisen in the 
content of inadvertent productions.” (citing D.C. Bar Ethics Op. No. 256 
(1995) (examining whether actions of producing counsel violated standard), 
available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/ 
opinion256.cfm)). 
84 See id. (citations omitted). 
85 Id. 
2011 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 001 
¶45 Prior to attending a pre-trial conference, attorneys should consult 
with their clients’ technology departments regarding data preservation.86 In 
particular, attorneys should ask IT personnel how much time and resources 
are needed to retrieve data. Having this information available prepares 
attorneys to better discuss the issue of cost allocation when it arises during 
pre-trial conferences.  
¶46 Attorneys attending a pre-trial conference should also be prepared 
to discuss the manner of production. For example, the parties might discuss 
whether the data would be copied to disks; the steps to take to ensure that 
ESI is not negligently destroyed; the procedures to be followed in the event 
ESI is inadvertently disclosed; the list of persons most knowledgeable about 
each party’s computer systems, cost allocation, and any other pertinent 
information that may affect the discovery response may be discussed.87 
¶47 Lastly, attorneys should keep privilege logs documenting each 
privileged document and a brief description of each document. Keeping a 
privilege log allows attorneys to be prepared to address inadvertent 
disclosure of privileged information. Others have suggested counsel have 
documents ready for in camera inspection during a pre-trial conference.88 
Either way, it is better to be prepared to discuss inadvertent disclosure early 
in the discovery process, rather than catching up later in the midst of trial. 
C. Third-Party Protective Orders 
¶48 As discussed above, attorneys may outsource data retrieval to e-
discovery companies.89 It is possible that the staff may unintentionally 
include privileged information in the data sent to requesting counsel. The 
parties should therefore agree that attorney-client privilege is not waived 
when information is inadvertently disclosed by human error, especially 
when a third-party is conducting the review of ESI. 
                                                      
86 Id. (citing Keir v. Unumprovident Corp., No. 02 Civ. 8781, 2003 WL 
21997747, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2003) (noting counsel’s failure to inform 
court of burdens and technological issues regarding preservation order)); see 
also Landmark Legal Found. v. EPA, 272 F. Supp. 2d 70, 77–79 (D.D.C. 2003) 
(reciting failures of agency’s attorneys to properly communicate preservation 
order to agency and holding that agency committed contempt of court by 
reformatting hard drives and erasing e-mail backup tapes after it received notice 
of the order). 
87 See generally SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 9. 
88 Id. 
89 See discussion supra Part II.  
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D. Remove Metadata 
¶49 In a recent publication, the ABA recommended attorneys remove 
metadata before e-mailing files.90 Attorneys can also use a third-party tool 
such as Metadata Assistant to reduce accidental exposure.91 Microsoft also 
offers a free “Remove Hidden Data” utility.92 One way to remove metadata 
in Word is to go to the Office button, choose “Prepare” and then “Inspect 
Document” to check for metadata.93 All comments and edits in word 
documents should be deleted and avoid using the redlining function in word 
processing documents as much as possible.94 Attorneys should also delete 
comments and disable the undo/redo options in WordPerfect documents.95  
¶50 Attorneys should note that they are ethically prohibited from 
altering documents that have potential evidentiary value.96 They should 
check their respective ethical rules to ensure compliance with the rules 
governing removal of metadata. 
E. Attorney Review 
¶51 The most effective way to prevent inadvertent disclosure is for 
attorneys to review all electronic documents before sending them to 
opposing counsel. This is an obvious recommendation, but so often 
attorneys do not review the documents because the data’s sheer size is 
intimidating. It is imperative that attorneys spend time and effort reviewing 
these documents before production. As stated earlier, one factor courts 
consider in determining waiver is the reasonableness of the precautions 
taken to prevent inadvertent disclosures.97 Whether the precautions taken 
were sufficient to prevent inadvertent disclosures depends on the time and 
effort expended by the attorneys. Thus, it is important that attorneys spend 
the time required to review the documents, no matter how tedious or 
uninteresting the process may be. 
                                                      
90 11 Steps to Protect Client Data, YOUR ABA (June 2010), 
http://www.abanet.org/media/youraba/201006/article02.html. 
91 Donna Payne, Metadata - Are you Protected?, 
http://www.payneconsulting.com/pub_books/articles/pdf/MidwestBarAssociatio
nConferenceMetadataHandout.pdf.  
92 Id.  
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442, at 5 
(2006). See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2006) (“A 
lawyer shall not unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or 
unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having 
potential evidentiary value.”). 
97 See discussion supra Part III, Section A.  
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CONCLUSION  
¶52 As e-discovery continues to pervade modern litigation, attorneys 
should better prepare themselves to handle attorney-client privilege issues 
that emerge out of our society’s increasing reliance on technology. 
Attorneys have plenty of resources and tools to assist them in ensuring that 
their clients’ confidences are kept. Technological ignorance is not a viable 
excuse. 
